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 This research examines Norway’s Russia-policy following the Russian annexation of the 
Crimean Peninsula and the aggression in East Ukraine. The research identifies attributes of 
Norway’s Russia-policy before and after Crimea and applies realist and liberal international 
relations theory to the discussion on whether Norway’s policy doctrine has changed. The main 
conclusion is that there has been a shift in Norway’s Russia-policy in the aftermath of Crimea 
from a liberal approach to realist foreign policy doctrine, but that Norway retain some emphasis 










The Russian annexation of Crimea and continued destabilization of Eastern Ukraine 
shocked the world and established a new security order in Europe. The shocking landgrab 
reversed the growing optimism in the western narrative of Russia becoming a more reliable 
partner and slowly but surely aligning themselves with western norms and values. Supposedly, 
the notion of Russian super power ambitions was starting to fade. Those assumptions turned out 
to be dramatically wrong. Observers says we should have seen it coming and that the Russo-
Georgia war in 2008 was not only a one-time incident, but instead a clear warning sign. As a 
student of international relations and international politics, I naturally found this interesting from 
an academic and professional point of view, and I have therefore monitored the developments 
ever since. 
I conduct this research as a Norwegian citizen with family roots in the northern part of 
Norway, not too far away from the Russian border. I grew up relatively close to one of Norway’s 
northernmost military airfield bases, where a large part of Norway’s fleet of combat fighter jets 
and other military equipment is stationed. 27 May last year, the same base was the target for at 
Russian military exercise including nine fighter jets in which they conducted an expedition 
simulating attacks on critical military infrastructure. The exercise was a response to a 
Norwegian-led military exercise with allies in near proximity of Russia, according to Morten 
Haga Lunde, head of the Norwegian Intelligence Service (Johnsen, 2018). However, the 
abovementioned exercise was not an isolated event. Numerous instances of Russian military 
activity in Norwegian airspace has been logged over the years. The frequency remains the same, 
but the complexity and level of sophistication is at a higher level since Crimea. Yet, the 
Norwegian Intelligence Service and state leaders remains steadfast in their opinion that Russia 
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does not project a clear military threat to Norway. I have consciously attempted, successfully or 
not, to draft this research with the aim to discuss Norway’s Russia-policy after Crimea in an 
objective manner, without bashing our neighbor to the East.  
     
      
 



















Chapter 1: Introduction 
Roughly four years has passed since the Ukrainian people rallied at Independent Square 
in Kiev to demonstrate their distrust and anger towards former President Victor Yanukovych and 
his cabinet. The protests occurred shortly after President Yanukovych’s cabinet chose to abandon 
a trade agreement with the European Union (EU), which would have brought Ukraine closer to 
the West. In a last-minute turnaround, President Yanukovych opted to look east and seek closer 
co-operation with President Vladimir Putin and his Russia. On 18 March 2014, following three 
months of violent conflicts in Ukraine and on the Crimean Peninsula, Russian and Crimean 
leaders signed a deal in Moscow, formalizing the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. 
A shocking land grab, which the world has not seen since Saddam Hussain annexed Kuwait in 
1990. Russia has continued to destabilize Eastern-Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea, with 
the support and deployment of “little green men” or soldiers without insignia if you like. Russia 
has not respected and upheld seize fire-agreements and the situation remains tense. As a result, 
we have a security scenario in Europe that has changed for the worse and Russia has lost most of 
its trust from the international community, which along with Norway, condemns Russia’s 
aggression in Ukraine. 
“We are faced with a different Russia. I want to warn against the fact that some people 
see this as something that is going to pass. The situation has changed, and it has changed 
profoundly” (Søreide, 2015). These words from, at the time Norwegian Defense Minister and 
now newly appointed Foreign Minister, Ine Søreide Eriksen, serves as the starting point of this 
research. Søreide Eriksen refers to a security scenario in Europe that has changed for the worse 
following the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in early 2014 and the further 
aggressions that followed in Eastern Ukraine. Not since WWII tore Europe asunder, and saw 
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Germany annex country after country, have we seen a European state annex territory from 
another state by use of military force. This fact speaks to the severity of the situation.  
The quote above is retrieved from a televised interview with Søreide Eriksen on CNN 
International 28 February 2015. It was the sincerity and degree of seriousness in the former 
Defense Minister’s message, and the assertiveness of her tone as she delivered the message, that 
ultimately led to the drafting of this research. There was no room for doubt in her message: I) 
We are faced with a different Russia, II) it is not going to pass, and III), the situation has changed 
profoundly. The message raises several questions. What does a changed security scenario in 
Europe and a different Russia mean for Norway who shares a border with Russia in the High 
North? How has Norway responded to the Russian actions in Ukraine? Do we see a significant 
shift in Norway’s Russia-policy from before and after Crimea? If so, is that shift surprising or 
predictable from an international relations theory perspective? These questions make the core of 
this thesis.  
The previous section has set the stage for this research. Moving forward, this research 
inquires further into Norway’s Russia-policy after the changed security scenario in Europe after 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine and the context described above. Roughly four years has passed 
since Crimea. Four years is a time span long enough to identify potential changes or trends in 
policy of a more fixed nature - rather than arbitrary - nature. This thesis argues that there has 
been a shift in Norway’s foreign policy doctrine towards Russia in the aftermath of Crimea from 
a neoliberal approach to a realist approach. The research’s main hypothesis is therefore:  
 
Norway’s Russia-policy has since the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula 
shifted from a liberal approach to a more realist foreign policy doctrine.  
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There are several reasons why this is an interesting research subject. One is Norway and 
Russia’s asymmetrical relationship in terms of real power. One is a small power state, some may 
argue a medium power state in some areas, and the other a great power state with super power 
ambitions. One state relies on protection and cooperation through NATO and deterrence from the 
nuclear umbrella of the United States of America (the U.S.), and the other has the largest nuclear 
capabilities in the world and a massive military that is being relentlessly modernized and 
expanded as we speak. While the Russian annexation never was a direct attack on Norway, it 
remains indisputable that it was an attack on the set of values and international norms that 
Norway thrives under, as well as the values that Norway strives to promote and protect. One can 
therefore say that the Russian annexation of Crimea was an indirect attack, or a direct threat, 
towards the set of liberal values and norms Norway abides to. By outlining Norway’s response to 
the what happened in Crimea, this research can tell us something about how a small state 
responds or react to aggression from a great power state towards a third-party state. Furthermore, 
we are to a large extent able to define status quo in Norway-Russia relations, which can be useful 
for future research.  
Chapter 2: Methodology  
In order to study Norway’s foreign policy response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and to 
identify changes in Norway’s Russia-policy after Crimea, it is important to provide a historical 
context to understand the nature of Norway-Russia relations prior to Crimea. A chapter is 
therefore devoted to highlighting the modus operandi and nature of Norway’s Russia-policy prior 
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the Russian annexation of Crimea. This is done do highlight the comparative nature of the 
hypothesis of this research.  
Moving on, the thesis will outline observations in Norway’s Russia-policy after the 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and a changed security scenario in Europe. By doing so, the 
thesis illustrates that there has been a shift in Norway’s Russia-policy. These observations in 
Norway’s policy are divided into three categories or policy areas: defense and security posture, 
economic relations and bilateral relations. The intention is to cover a broad range of relevant 
policy areas. Finally, these observations are analyzed and explained through the lens of 
international relations (IR) theory before reaching a conclusion. In order to discuss this case 
through the lens of IR theory, it is also necessary to explain and outline the relevant IR theories 
applied in this thesis. Therefore, a chapter is devoted to the theoretical framework of this 
research. 
Before moving on to the chapter highlighting Norway’s Russia-policy after Crimea, this 
section covering the thesis’ methodology provides an explanation of research design, as well as 
definitions of relevant terms and concepts necessary to understand the scope of the thesis. This 
includes defining two dimensions of Norway’s Russia-policy, that is 1) the bilateral dimension 
and 2) the NATO dimension, as well as a definition of the “High North” which is a term used 
frequently throughout the thesis. This section also includes a literature review of existing 
relevant research on the subject.  
 A conclusion summarizes the major findings in the analysis and looks at the path ahead. 
 10 
Research Design  
This thesis applies qualitative research method, as a qualitative research design is better 
suited to answer the research questions in this research. Quantifying changes in the two 
dimensions of Norway relations to Russia would be a daunting task, and furthermore it would be 
challenging to include changes in rhetoric and policies. The research is based on a document 
study, which is a type of qualitative data collection. The ultimate purpose of a document study is 
to arrive at an understanding of the meaning and significance of what the documents contains – 
both in a literal and in an interpretative sense (Christensen et al, 2013, Pp 139; Scott, 1990, Pp 
28). A large number of speeches delivered by - and interviews of - Norwegian government 
officials, official government documents, white papers, journal articles, scholarly work from 
research institutions, and newspaper articles from the time of the Russian aggressions started up 
to recently, serves as the data for the document analysis. The thesis analyzes the collected data, 
and test rhetoric, statements and policies of the Norwegian government against the hypotheses of 
the thesis.  
Definitions of terms and concepts 
Defining the bilateral dimension and the NATO dimension 
 One can argue that Norway’s Russia-policy has two key dimensions. One dimension 
defined by Norway’s geographical position as Russia’s neighbor, and one dimension defined by 
Norway’s membership in NATO and allegiance to Russia’s idea of the West (Støre, 2008). 
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, launched this idea in a foreign policy 
speech at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in 2008. This thesis borrows 
and elaborate Støre’s concept of two dimensions in Norway-Russia relations, and applies the 
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dimensions in the context of the abovementioned events in the Ukraine and the thesis’ research 
question.  
It is constructive to apply the two dimensions in this inquiry because they illustrate two 
different approaches is Norway’s Russia-policy, which is complex and demands a balancing act 
of contradicting interests. Because the two dimensions are in fact somewhat contradicting, but 
not necessarily in a deconstructive manner. On one side, Norway wants a solid and well-
functioning relationship with Russia, based on pragmatic cooperation in areas of mutual- and 
strategic interest, especially in the High North (Brende, 2016). On the contrary, the Norwegian 
Government is committed to NATO and does not hesitate to criticize and stand up to Russian 
violations of International Law and disregard for human rights. Balancing the two dimensions is 
therefore a crucial task in Norway’s Russia-relations. Definitions of the two dimensions, which 
this thesis title 1) the NATO dimension and 2) the bilateral dimension, follows in the next 
paragraph.  
The NATO dimension, as applied in this thesis, cover Norway’s NATO-membership as a 
deterrent to Russia and Norway’s security and defense policy.  
The bilateral dimension, as applied in this thesis, cover Norway’s bilateral engagement 
with Russia, hereunder bilateral treaties- and cooperation, trade and commerce, political- and 
diplomatic contact.   
Defining the “High North”  
What is “the High North”? Why is it necessary to explain the term in the context of this 
thesis? Odd Gunnar Skagestad provides perhaps the best academic piece on this subject. In his 
article “The High North – An Elastic Concept in Norwegian Arctic Policy” (2010), Skagestad 
thoroughly outlines in a historical context how the concept has developed, how it has been used 
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and its role in Norwegian politics. The High North is the English equivalent to the Norwegian 
term “nordområdene”. The literal translation of “nordområdene”, however, is “the northern 
areas”, but this translation does not serve much purpose. According to Skagestad (2010), this 
translation would need additional context-defining elements (the northern areas of what, where 
or in relation to what?), and would therefore cause more havoc than clarity.  
Former Foreign Affairs Minister, Knut Frydenlund was the first to use the term 
“nordområdene” in his foreign policy report to the Norwegian Parliament 1 November 1974. At 
the time, the term referred to a vaguely defined stretch of land and sea territories in the Arctic 
and the Sub-Arctic to the north of the Norwegian mainland, including the Svalbard archipelago 
(Skagestad, 2010). Thereafter, the term picked up momentum and saw frequent use in academic 
work and in political contexts as well. 
The English equivalent, however, is a newer addition to the vocabulary of Norwegian 
Government officials and scholars. Norwegian diplomat, Sverre Jervell, was the first to take use 
of the term “High North” in his book “The Military Build Up in the High North”, published in 
1986 (Skagestad, 2010). Yet, he did not offer a precise definition. The term “the High North” 
caught on in the following two decades, and as of 2003, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
chose it as the official English translation for the Norwegian word “nordområdene”. The MFA 
underwent an internal restructuring at the time, and they included “nordområdene” in one of their 
sections. Consequently, the MFA had to come up with an appropriate translation in English, and 
the High North was their choice for pragmatic reasons such as availability (Skagestad, 2010). 
Three years later in 2006, the Norwegian Government published its High North Strategy, which 
included a definition of the term “High North” developed specifically to serve the purpose of the 
Strategy. It goes as follows:  
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“The High North is a broad concept both geographically and politically. In geographical 
terms, it covers the sea and land, including islands and archipelagos, stretching from 
northwards from the southern boundary in Nordland County in Norway and eastwards from the 
Greenland Sea to the Barents Sea and the Pechora Sea. In political terms, it includes the 
administrative entities in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia that are part of the Barents 
Cooperation. Furthermore, Norway’s High North Policy overlaps with the Nordic Cooperation, 
our relations with the US and Canada through the Arctic Council, and our relations with the EU 
through the Northern Dimension”. 
It is noteworthy that the Norwegian Government in 2009, in a follow-up document to the 
High North Strategy, completely change their tone and acknowledged that “We do not have any 
precise definition of “The High North” in the Norwegian public discourse” (Skagestad, 2010). 
Furthermore, Skagestad (2010) underlines in his article that the official documents and reports he 
covers all seem to lack a precise definition, which boils down to the complexity of the term “The 
High North”. The High North is a dynamic concept that changes meaning over the course of 
time, and furthermore, its content changes depending both on who applies and the context. 
Pragmatically, the term can serve as geographical delamination because it does have a 
geographical aspect. However, it is primarily a political concept (Skagestad, 2010). According to 
Skagestad (2010), “The High North” is “a concept which pertains to Norway’s northern land and 
island territories, sea areas, adjacent areas and neighboring areas, insofar as these territories or 
areas capture the focus of the public attention and are highlighted as political priority areas”. 
This brings us to the second initial question in this section. Why is the High North important in 
the context of this thesis? 
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 There is no doubt concerning the High North’s strategic and political importance for the 
Norwegian Government, and in that regard so is relations with Russia. In other words, the High 
North as a policy area is the core of Norway-Russia relations. This becomes apparent in 
numerous Government reports and strategies since 2003, when the High North truly gained 
momentum in the political discourse in Norway and became a new dimension in Norwegian 
foreign policy. In December 2006, the Norwegian Government launched their first High North 
Strategy. The Strategy highlights taking advantage of the opportunities in the High North as one 
of the most important priorities for the Norwegian Government for the years to come 
(Norwegian Government, 2006). The Strategy also states that “our [Norway’s] relations with 
Russia form the central bilateral dimension of Norway’s High North Policy”. (Norwegian 
Government, 2006). Furthermore, former Foreign Affairs Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, pointed out 
in 2008 that “the High North is the most important strategic area of the Norwegian 
Government’s foreign policy”, and that “Norway-Russia relation is key in Norway’s High North 
Strategy and foreign policy in general” (Støre, 2008). These are only a few out of many 
examples that highlights the significance of the High North as a policy area in regard to 
Norway’s Russia-policy.   
 It is not, however, the intention of this thesis to elaborate and give too much attention to the 
“High North” as a concept. Skagestad (2010) provides a brilliant overview of the subject in his 
article “Where is the "High North"? - The High North - an elastic concept?” which is cited in 
this thesis. The purpose of including this section is to underscore the importance of the High 
North concerning Norway-Russia relations and Norway’s Russia-policy, the latter being the 
focal point of this thesis. As will become even more apparent as this thesis develop, is the 
significant role the High North as a policy area play in Norway’s current Russia-policy. 
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Providing some clarification of the term “High North” is therefore necessary as this thesis uses it 
frequently. While a precise definition of the term “High North” still lacks at this point, this 
section has, to some extent, brought to attention the complexity of the term and highlighted how 
the term has developed over time. Read Where is the "High North"? - The High North - an 
elastic concept? (Skagestad, 2010) for a more in-depth analysis of the term “High North”. 
Literature Review 
A literature review did not uncover much research on the somewhat specific nature of 
this inquiry, which is not surprising taking into consideration the fact that the events in Crimea 
occurred a relatively recently (roughly four years ago today). If you look at four years in an 
isolated manner it may seem like a long time, but to implement policy takes time and it takes 
even longer observe if these policies represent a significant change in direction.  
Bragstad (2016) studied Norway’s balancing policies (deterrence and reassurance) 
towards Russia in the period after 2008 and thereby overlaps with the inquiry of this thesis. By 
analyzing policy documents and speeches in a qualitative approach, Bragstad (2016) found that 
Norway throughout the period emphasizes both deterrence and reassurance in its policies, and 
that one could not conclude that Norway favored deterrence at the expense of reassurance. But 
there is, however, a tendency to emphasize deterrence both in ambitions and practice, and that 
the emphasis on reassurance is somewhat reduced. Bragstad (2016) conclusion is that there is no 
evidence that Norway is disregarding its balancing policy towards Russia.  
Blakar (2016, p. 3) studied the effect of the “Crimean-crisis” on cooperation in the 
Barents Sea. The study found that the events in Crimea to a small degree affected Norway-
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Russia relations and cooperation in the Barents Sea, and that the cooperation remained normal in 
a worsened period of time of Norway-Russia relations (Blakar, 2016, p. 3) 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
The purpose of this research is not only to identify potential changes in Norway’s Russia-
policy, but to connect the abstract world of theory and political realties by making sense of the 
dynamics at work. In this case, the dynamics at work is the changed security scenario in Europe 
following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of East Ukraine, and how the 
Norwegian government and their policy makers has responded. Theory can help us make sense 
of - and understand - complex dynamics in play on the international stage, as well as predict, or 
fail to predict, how states and policy makers respond or react to these dynamics. It is not the 
purpose of this research to outline in depth - and provide a wide discussion on - the many 
interesting aspects and nuances of IR theory. But in order to test IR theories’ ability to predict 
and explain Norway’s response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of East 
Ukraine, it is necessary to understand a sufficient scope of the lenses we are applying to study 
this specific case.  
 The IR discipline contains several different theories and paradigms, which all offer valid 
explanations and points of view about international politics and the dynamics at work on the 
international arena. Different IR theories are able to explain global events, behaviors and 
patterns.  While the theories are based on different dogmas and offers both different and often 
contradicting explanations, it is important to underline that one theory does not trump the other 
in terms of validity. On the contrary, the wide array of theories allows for an enriched discussion 
and more ways of understanding and explaining dynamics on the international arena, one theory 
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may explain one event better than another, and one theory might allow us to make better 
predictions about state behavior than another.  
While reiterating the fact that the IR discipline includes several theories and paradigms, 
one may still argue that there are two main paradigms in IR: realism and liberalism. Walt (1998), 
however, operates with three paradigms by adding constructivism to the mix. While states are the 
main unit of analysis in both realism and liberalism, constructivism apply individuals and 
especially élites as the main unit of analysis. As states (predominately Norway, but also Russia) 
are the units for the analysis in this thesis it makes more sense to devote most attention to 
liberalism and realism. However, constructivism is useful in explaining Norway’s perception of a 
threat from Russia as social norms and their impact on state behavior are central to constructivist 
IR theory, and useful in explaining what kind of behavior Norway wants to see from Russia as 
well. Hoffmann (2010) explains that social norms were conceptualized as aspects of social 
structure that emerged from the actions and beliefs of actors in specific communities, and that 
norms shaped those actions and beliefs by constituting actors’ identities and interests (Hoffman, 
2010). This research has already pointed that Norway’s foreign policy and international 
engagement has been heavily shaped by liberal norms and values such as respect for 
International Law and human rights, democracy, freedom of press, political transparency and 
engagement in multilateralism. These norms and ideals are typically shared by the west 
(Western-European states, the US and NATO-members). Hoffman (2010) explain that ideas 
about whether actors reason about norms or through norms can be linked to behavioral logics, 
which provide conceptions of how norms and actors are linked. And furthermore, that shared 
ideas about appropriate state behavior has a significant impact on the nature and functioning of 
world politics (Hoffmann, 2010). The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a breach of 
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International Law and hence a direct attack on the liberal norms shared by Norway and the west. 
Norway’s policy response to Russia can therefore potentially also be viewed as a reaction to 
Russia’s violation of these norms. While Norway does not consider Russia to pose a direct 
military threat despite military build-up and modernization, the perception of a direct threat to 
western common norms and values are still highly relevant. Ideally, Norway would want to see 
that Russia, to a respectable degree, adhere to the same norms and values as Norway and the 
west. A general observation was that Russia, from the end of the Cold War, was leaving its super 
power ambitions behind and becoming increasingly intertwined with the west. Whether it is 
possible for Russia to fully share western norms and ideals, taking in consideration its history, 
domestic political situation and political leadership, is another interesting question but not one 
for this thesis. The following paragraphs will highlight important elements in realism and 
liberalism and explain their relevance for this research.  
 The realist school of thought contains a dogma arguing that states, dominated by self-
interest, pursue – and compete for – power. Power is the ultimate currency of international 
politics, according to Mearsheimer (2010), and economic and military capabilities constitute the 
main instruments of power. Realism was the dominant theoretical tradition during the Cold War 
(Walt, 1998). This was partly due to the fact that it provided a straight-forward and meaningful 
explanation for war, the American-Soviet arms race, alliances and the pessimistic view on the 
prospects of war and conflict (Walt, 1998). Hans Morgenthau is perhaps the main proponent of 
what is known as classic realism. Morgenthau, and other classic realists, argue that it is in within 
a states’ nature, like with human beings, to dominate others and pursue power (Mearsheimer, 
2010).  
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However, the realist school continued to evolve, and from it grew neorealist theories or 
structural realism. This will be the term used in this thesis. The basic difference between 
structural realism and classical realism encompass the question of why states pursue power. As 
explained above, the classic realists’ narrative is that states, and mainly great power states, 
pursue power because it is within human nature - and hence a states’ and state leaders’ nature - to 
do so. For structural realist, human nature has little to do with why states pursue power. Instead, 
it is the structure and architecture of the international system that forces a state to pursue power 
(Mearsheimer, 2010). It involves a zero-sum game in terms of power, formed by the 
international system, which does not include a higher authority to control great-power states or 
prohibit from them from going to war against each other. Therefore, they are forced to seek 
power in terms of mainly economic and military capabilities. But how much power is enough? 
According to Mearsheimer (2010), the answer to how much power is enough creates a 
divide within structural realism. An offensive structural realist (Mearsheimer) argues that a state 
must pursue as much power as possible and to pursue hegemony. Lack of information 
concerning other great powers’ intentions and the self-help nature of the international system 
serving as the main argument. A defensive structural realist (Waltz) argue that it is unwise for a 
great power to pursue too much power, as the international system eventually will punish them, 
and other great powers will try to outbalance power.  
It is reasonable to assume that the Russian annexation of Crimea was a Russian attempt 
to pursue power regardless of motives, and there are two contradicting narratives on why this 
occurred. The west’s (Western European states, NATO and the US) narrative argues that Russia 
has super power ambitions and pursues power in order to dominate the international arena. The 
Russian narrative argues that the expansion of NATO and the EU into states in Russia’s 
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neighborhood forced and entitled Russia to take assertive actions in order to protect national 
strategic interests such as maintaining open sea lines of communication for the Russian navy in 
based in Sevastopol in Crimea. Defensive structural realism would argue that was both unwise of 
the west to expand its sphere of influence into Russia’s close vicinity and for Russia to annex 
Crimea as it would present a threat to either party. So, what does realism predict that states or 
actors do when there is a change in dynamics or a perception of a threat? They balance out the 
power against the dominant threat. In realism, military and economic capabilities constitute the 
main instruments of power as previously mentioned. Ways for states to balance power could 
typically be to increase its military capabilities by investing, strengthening and reassuring 
military alliances, upping deterrence measures and more.  
Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane are the main proponents behind complex 
interdependence theory. In their book Power and Interdependence, Keohane & Nye (2012) 
explain that complex interdependence theory has three main characteristics: 1) there are multiple 
actors on the world stage, and they communicate through multiple channels, which they call 
interstate, trans-governmental and transnational relations; 2) there is an absence of hierarchy 
among issues in international relations, meaning that military security is not the dominant issue 
like in realism; and 3) Soft power and diplomacy trumps the use of military force because of the 
interdependence between the actors. Great powers, states, multilateral organizations, and 
international organizations all influence the process of decision-making. Furthermore, complex 
interdependence theory argues that the world is economically intertwined and that peaceful 
resolutions outweighs war because of that. 
As outlined in the chapters above, the modus operandi in Norway’s foreign policy 
doctrine towards Russia has since the end of the Cold War been dominated by bilateral 
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cooperation in areas of mutual interest, engagement in multilateral organizations such as the 
Arctic Council and then Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and a desire to have a close and productive 
relationship. These elements check the boxes of characteristics in Keohane and Nye’s complex 
interdependence theory outlined above. So, what type of behavior from states does complex 
interdependence predict when confronted with the threat of Russian expansion of power? We 
know that complex interdependence theory predicts states to prefer soft power and diplomacy 
over military measures as the cost of a potential war is too big. States would therefore turn to 
reassurance measures, confidence-building and diplomacy either bilateral or through 
international organizations.  
Chapter 4: Norway-Russia Relations Before Crimea 
Formal bilateral relations between Norway and Russia (Norway - Soviet Union relations 
up to 1991) trace back to 1905, four years after the dissolution of the union between Norway and 
Sweden. The dissolution of the union ensured full autonomy over government affairs for 
Norway, including foreign policy, which Sweden conducted during the time of the union. 
Norway was among the first states to pursue bilateral relations with Russia after dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. This may be a natural consequence of the two countries being neighbor states, 
but it highlights the long-lasting bond of the two states. However, the people of Norway and 
Russia were intertwined even before bilateral relations were formalized. Norwegians and 
Russians engaged in the so called “Pomor”-trade, which can be traced back to the 18th century. 
Informal trade routes were established in the High North, and Russian merchants sailed to 
Norway to trade goods for fish. This long-lasting tradition fostered a strong people-to-people 
bond in the High North, which exists to this day. After bilateral relations were formalized 1905, 
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Norway has consciously defined a pragmatic foreign policy approach towards Russia, and the 
nature of Norway-Russia relations has been productive and positive.  
April 2014 marked the 70-year anniversary of the liberation of Finnmark in the 
northernmost part of Norway after several years of German occupation during World War II. 
After three years of intense combats between German and Soviet troops on the Soviet side of the 
Norwegian-Soviet border, the Red Army launched a heavy counter-offensive 7 October 1944. 
The same day, Adolf Hitler himself decided to withdraw their roughly 200.000 soldiers, 20 000 
military vehicles, 60 000 horses and many war prisoners. The withdrawal was ruthless and saw 
German troops burn entire villages to the ground to make sure nothing was left behind for the 
Soviet troops racing after. 18 October the Red Army marched into Norway without consent from 
the Norwegian government, and thereby raising both questions and serious concern about their 
intentions. From there on the Red Army continued to force German troops out of Norway, city 
after city starting with Kirkenes, which was a milestone. In the late stage of the German retreat, 
Norway deployed 3,000 soldiers to the region along with the Soviet troops still present. 
According to Colonel Arne Dahl, in charge of the 3,000 soldiers, the Norwegian-Soviet 
cooperation was flawless (Skancke / University of Oslo). However, there was still a concern 
within the interim Norwegian administration about a scenario where Soviet troops was given 
order to stay put in Finnmark. After all, their numbers were significant and significantly 
outweighed Norway’s military presence. Yet, after an official request from Norwegian 
government, Soviet troops withdrew from Norway 25 September in 1955 (Skancke / University 
of Oslo). The Soviet withdrawal was the last to be sorted, and Norway made arrangements with 
US and British first. This despite concern over whether the Soviet military presence could 
become permanent. One can argue that the way Soviet troops conducted themselves in 
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Finnmark, and the fact that the Soviet in the end respected Norwegian sovereignty, was an 
important confidence building element in order to achieve the productive neighborly relations we 
have seen up recent time. It also marks an important milestone in Norway-Russia relations. 
Norwegians will forever be grateful for Russian troops coming to their aid during the occupation, 
was His Majesty King Harald V’s message to the Russian delegation led by Foreign Minister 
Sergey Lavrov at the anniversary ceremony in Finnmark in 2014 (Horn et al., 2014). Norway’s 
Prime Minister, Erna Solberg, was also present at the ceremony and presented her gratitude for 
the Russian contribution.  
 There are numerous examples of cooperation and bilateral agreements amongst the two 
states. The year 2010 was a milestone, when Norway and Russia signed the treaty concerning 
“Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean” and thereby 
resolving a crucial question in Norway-Russia relations (Norwegian Government, 2010). The 
parties signed the treaty 15 September 2010 following 40 years of negotiations. In short, the 
treaty determines the boundary between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea and the Arctic 
Ocean. The treaty also includes agreements to continue cooperation concerning fishery and 
exploitation of a potential hydrocarbon deposit that extends across the delimitation line 
(Norwegian Government, 2010). According to the Norwegian Government, the treaty contributes 
to legal clarity and predictability in the area. The same applies for the Incidents at Sea-
Agreement, which Norway and Russia signed in 1990. The intention of the Incidents at Sea-
Agreement is to avoid unwanted incidents in situations where the two parties’ naval vessels and 
military planes operate in territory outside their borders by emphasizing clear communication, 
openness about intentions and predictability. The Agreement also covers Coast Guard 
cooperation, including search- and rescue missions.  
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Clarity, consistency and predictability has been, and still are, key aspects in Norway’s 
foreign policy approach to Russia. The general Norwegian rhetoric has been to pursue close 
cooperation in areas that will produce productive results for both parties, such as the areas 
covered in the aforementioned treaty and the Incidents at Sea-Agreement. In a speech at a 
conference convened by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in 2008 former Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, stated that “neighborly relations with Russia are on a 
positive track” and that “these relations have practically never been as broad as they are now – 
yet considerable progress can still be made” (Støre, 2008). The Norwegian rhetoric in 2015 is 
much but unchanged. In the words of yet a former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Børge 
Brende: “Norway wants the best relationship possible with Russia. We have positive experiences 
with reaching bilateral solutions to common challenges” (Brende, 2015). Former Norwegian 
Foreign Minister, Søreide Eriksen, describes this dimension of Norway-Russia relations as 
“cooperation where possible”, and “cooperation based on mutual interests” (Søreide Eriksen, 
2015).  
The words of Minister Søreide Eriksen highlight another important aspect of Norway-
Russia relations: in areas where there is no mutual interest, and areas where Norway and 
Russia’s policies do not overlap. Russia is lagging behind developed Western countries in terms 
of respect for democracy, rule of law, human rights and civil society. These values are the 
bedrock of Norwegian foreign policy, and are values Norway always try to promote. Russian 
President Vladimir Putin has, since assuming the presidency, continued to shift power to the 
President’s Office and thereby centralize his power. His disregard for the abovementioned values 
does not coincide with Norway’s ideal preference of how Russia should be. Bilateral relations 
between Norway and Russia can therefore be challenging from a Norwegian perspective. On one 
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hand, a productive and good relationship with Russia is of Norway’s interest, especially with 
regards to cooperation in the High North. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, 
stated in 2008 that “the High North is the most important strategic priority area of the Norwegian 
Government’s foreign policy”, and furthermore that “the development of Norway-Russia 
relations is a main priority both for our [Norway’s] High North strategy and for our foreign 
policy in general” (Støre, 2008). However, promoting and standing up for core liberal and 
democratic values is a fundamental interest to Norway. Balancing these interests is a key element 
in Norway’s foreign policy towards Russia.  
Russia also suffers from vast corruption in its public sector and lack of transparency in 
their legal system. As of 2014, Transparency International ranks Russia as number 136/175 on 
the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The CPI ranks countries based on how corrupt 
Transparency International perceive a country’s public sector to be (Transparency International, 
2014). These factors influence the degree of Norwegian engagement in Russia in terms of trade, 
private investment through Norwegian companies and bilateral agreements. Støre (2008) 
describe this as modern risk factors, and states that a country with these characteristics makes a 
difficult neighbor. Nevertheless, by being clear and consistent in their views concerning Russia’s 
lack of respect for core democratic values, and at the same time open to the “cooperation where 
possible”-approach, Norway has developed a relationship with Russia based on mutual interests, 
cooperation and predictability. This has been the modus operandi in Norway’s Russia-policy 
since the Cold War. However, what happens with Norway’s Russia-policy when the dynamics in 
play is no longer predictable?  
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Chapter 5: Norway’s Russia-Policy After Crimea - A Change of Track?  
 In this chapter, the thesis outlines observations in Norway’s foreign policy in the context 
of the Russian annexation of Crimea. It touches upon a range of policy areas that are important in 
Norway-Russia relations. The chapter is divided into three subsections, namely 1) military and 
security posture, 2) economic relations, and 3) bilateral relations. An attempt is made to strictly 
highlight policy and not engage in a discussion or analysis at this point in the thesis.  
Defense and Security Posture 
This section outlines observations and occurrences in Norway’s defense and security 
response following the actions of Russia in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.  
 Defense spending  
 The Norwegian government has put an emphasis on improving and reforming Norway’s 
military capabilities, which is illustrated by the increase in defense spending. 
In their proposal for the 2015 defense budget, the Norwegian Government proposed an 
increase the budget by 3.4 percent, amounting to NOK 1.460 billion. Key focus areas in the 2015 
defense budget were the goal of enhancing operational capabilities for the Norwegian Armed 
Forces to contribute to societal security by increasing readiness capabilities of the Air Force’s 
helicopters at Rygge and Bardufoss (Norwegian Government, 2014). Additionally, the 
Norwegian Government proposed another NOK 1.034 billion to continue the process of 
procuring new F-35 fighter jets, which in long term will replace the outdated and worn-out F-16 
fighter jets. Defense Minister Søreide described the budget good, sober and realistic when 
presenting it in October 2014 (Norwegian Government, 2014).  
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The defense budget for 2016 increased with 9.8 percent in real terms, which makes it the 
highest increase in the defense budget throughout history for the Norwegian Government. A key 
factor for behind this increase is the launch of a new long-term defense plan called “Capable and 
Sustainable” presented by the Norwegian government 16 June 2016 (Norwegian Ministry of 
Defense, 2016), which aims to renew and bolster the Norwegian military for a deteriorated and 
worsened security scenario in its close vicinity. The number one priority is to strengthen the 
national defense, through a) maintaining situational awareness and strengthen the ability to 
conduct crisis management operations, b) improving readiness levels, combat power and 
survivability, c) improving the ability to receive allied reinforcements, and d) increasing allied 
military presence and more frequent exercises and training (Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 
2016). The second priority is to strengthen NATO’s ability for collective defense. The plan 
identifies Russia’s growing military capabilities and its use of force as the most significant 
change in the Norwegian security environment. Furthermore, the plan points to Russia’s military 
reform and modernization of its conventional forces and highlights repeated willingness from the 
Russian side to use a wide range of measures to sustain their political dominance and influence, 
including military force (Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 2016). While stating that Russia does 
not pose a military threat to Norway, the plan still considers Russia as a key factor for 
Norwegian defense planning. The plan also emphasizes the High North, where Russia’s military 
presence and activity has increased over the last years. Despite the fact that the High North and 
the Arctic remains a region characterized by cooperation and stability, the Norwegian Ministry 
of Defense is reluctant to rule out a scenario where Russia turns to military force in pursuit of 
their foreign interests in the region. In the closing remarks of the long-term plan, former Defense 
Minister Søreide Eriksen underscores that “changes to and developments in our strategic 
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environment over the past few years have reminded us that we cannot take our security for 
granted” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). It is reasonable to believe that the Defense Minister 
is referring to Russia’s use of military force in Ukraine. Both the Defense Minister’s statement, 
and the plan’s content and rationale highlighted above, should therefore be viewed to some 
extent as a response to the changed and worsened security scenario in Europe following Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea and violation of International Law.  
The historic increase in the 2016 defense budget ensures continuation of the F-35 
procurement process with earmarked funding. Furthermore, it continues to emphasize the 
strengthening of military capabilities and military presence in the High North and areas close to 
the Russian border through increased patrols (Norwegian Government, 2015). This includes 
permanently deploying an Ula-class submarine at the Ramsund Military Base in Northern 
Norway and upping the amount of sailing days in the High North to 250 days a year. In addition, 
the 2016 budget will enable the P-3C Maritime Patrol Aircraft, known as the Orion, to conduct 
both longer and more frequent patrols in the High North and thereby strengthening surveillance 
capabilities (Norwegian Government, 2015). The Intelligence Service also receives a substantial 
boost in funding for 2016, with NOK 250 million more in their budget post.  
 The defense budget for 2017 also saw an increase amounting to 4,2 percent from the 
previous year. A large portion of the 2017 budget was earmarked for much needed maintenance 
on equipment, acquisition of spare parts and building reserves. As with the two previous budgets, 
a considerable chunk of the budget is allocated to the F-35 procurement process. The 2017 
military budget follows up on the “Capable and Sustainable” long-term plan, in which Russia 
plays a considerable role in terms of Norwegian defense planning.  
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 The Norwegian government continues to increase their military budget in 2018 as well. 
In nominal terms, the increase amounts to 3.8 billion NOK compared to the 2017 budget. The 
2018 budget should also be viewed as a continuation of the new long-term plan launched in 
2016. In the Parliament proposal Prop. 1 S (2017-2018) for fiscal year 2018 the Ministry of 
Defense mentions Russia 54 times in the 178-page long document. It highlights that Norwegian 
security policy historically has been shaped by Norway’s relationship with Russia, and that 
Russia’s has caused serious uncertainty through its actions, anti-Western rhetoric and increased 
military activities in Norway’s and NATO’s close vicinity. Furthermore, it points to Russia’s 
swift reestablishment of a modernized and powerful military and its will to use military force to 
pursue strategic interests and thereby violating international law (Ministry of Defense, 2017-
2018). It also underscores the fact that NATO remains the cornerstone in Norway’s security 
policy and highlights the need for Norway to carry its weight and to honor their commitment to 
the burden-sharing principle in NATO (Ministry of Defense, 2017-2018).  
 
Table 1: Norway’s total defense budgets from 2015-2018.  
     
Adopted budget 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Budget total (in 1000 
NOK) 
43 787 866 48 892 262 51 248 190 55 021 199 
Percentage increase 
from previous fiscal 
year’s budget 





A report published by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment from 2015 (Berg 
& Kvalvik, 2015) studies and describes growth in the Norwegian defense sector after WWII up 
to 2015. One finding is that, while defense budgets saw a reduced amounting to roughly 1 
percent annually in the 1990s after the Cold War, defense budgets has increased by 
approximately 1,5 percent since year 2000. Compared to the annual percentage increase starting 
from 2015-2018 illustrated in the table above, the 1,5 percent increase in defense budgets from 
2000-2015 seems rather insignificant. However, the Norwegian defense budget is still well 
below the NATO target of 2 % of gross domestic product (GDP). The latest numbers available 
from 2016, as official GDP numbers are available only 23 months after the end of the fiscal year, 
shows that Norway’s defense spending amounted to 1,55 % of GDP (Ministry of Defense, 2017-
2018). Norway does, however, allocate a substantial amount of their defense spending towards 
new investments and has hit NATO’s 20 % investment requirement in all the above-mentioned 
defense budgets.  
 To summarize the observations above, it is clear that Norway has, since 2015 and the 
years after the Russian annexation of Crimea, significantly increased their defense spending.  
This despite decreasing GDP growth, partly, but far from exclusively, due to lower oil prices. 
Norway’s relationship with Russia has historically been an important element in Norwegian 
defense planning, and Russia’s increased military activity in the High North, their military 
reform, and their willingness to use military force as a tool of pursuing strategic interests, seem 
to have made Russia even more relevant in this regard. Norway’s defense budgets since 2015 
and the new “Capable and Sustainable”- plan clearly illustrates Norway’s goals to strengthen 
military capabilities in terms of patrolling and monitoring in the High North, by upping readiness 
levels, crisis management and transatlantic cooperation. The procurement of the new F-35 fighter 
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jets is a significant investment in both defensive and offensive capabilities, which is highlighted 
in the following section. 
The F-35 Fighter Jets Procurement  
 
In an article, the Norwegian newspaper, Klassekampen, claims to have insight in a 
classified government document highlighting the rationale behind the procurement of 52 new 
American-made F-35 fighter jets, as well as possible scenarios and missions for them to be 
deployed based on information stemming from the Norwegian Intelligence Service (Lyseberg & 
Tallaksen, 2016). The document called “Antallsanalysen” (Numbers analysis, authors 
translation) served as information with regards to the decision-making process, and the question 
of how many F-35 fighter jets the Norwegian government should procure. This document has 
been updated over time and adapted to the current security situation. One of three possible 
scenarios presented in the document is a scenario where Russian navy vessels and fighter jets 
have entered Norwegian territorial waters, and Norway is therefore in a full-scale war with 
Russia. The scenario demands deployment of the full fleet of 52 jets to attack Russian navy 
vessels and fighter jets in the Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea, in addition to targeting military 
infrastructure on the ground on Russian territory, such as antiaircraft, aircrafts and other military 
targets. The above is to a large extent confirmed by former Deputy Defense Minister, Øystein 
Bø, when asked about the contents of the document (Lyseberg & Tallaksen, 2016). The two 
other scenarios highlight the importance of the capability to handle different tasks 
simultaneously, and 12 fighter jets are to be set aside to NATO operations.  
Based on the above, one can argue that a potential threat from Russia, in addition to other 
strategic defense and security interests, served as an important argument during the decision-
making process when acquiring the new F-35 fighter jets.  
 32 
Bilateral military activities 
 The Norwegian Ministry of Defense informed in late March 2014, shortly after the 
Russia annexation of Crimea, that they suspended all planned military activities with Russia until 
the end of May 2014 (Ministry of Defense, 2014a). What later became apparent after renewed 
assessments of the situation was that the suspension would last throughout 2015. In three press 
releases from the Ministry of Defense (Ministry of Defense 2014a, 2014b & 2014c), the 
Norwegian Government informed that the suspension of all bilateral military activities would 
remain in place throughout 2015, starting in March 2014. In total, the suspension includes at 
least 19 planned bilateral visits or activities, including exercise “Northern Eagle” – a major joint 
naval military exercise (Ministry of Defense, 2014a).  
NATO 
 Norway’s NATO-membership is critical in how Norway approaches and thinks about 
Norway’s Russia-relations, and NATO is the backbone of Norway’s general defense strategy. 
Relying on NATOs article 5 and the idea of collective security remains an integral part of 
Norway’s defense strategy. Former Defense Minister Søreide Eriksen highlights this in a speech 
at the Atlantic Council conference on the European Security Landscape, in which she states that 
“at the end of the day…Norway depends on NATO for our [Norway’s] security” (Søreide 
Eriksen, 2015). Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg also underlines the importance of 
NATO for Norway’s security a speech at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Stavanger, 12 
October 2015, in which she said that “sixty-six years after it was established, NATO remains the 
bedrock of Norway’s security” (Solberg 2015). Hence, it is relevant to outline occurrences in 
NATOs strategies and rhetoric following the Ukraine-conflict, as it affects the policies of the 
Norwegian Government and vice versa.  
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 The NATO Summit in Wales on 4-5 September was the first instance of a major NATO-
gathering after the Ukraine conflict. Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg, former Foreign 
Affairs Minister Børge Brende and former Defense Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide all participated. 
In short, NATO agreed to a “Readiness Action Plan”, with the goal to enhance NATO’s 
preparedness and responsiveness, including its posture (Government of the United Kingdom 
2014). The backdrop for this policy paper is the “serious crises which affect security and stability 
to NATO’s east and south…[and] include Russia’s illegal self-declared “annexation” of Crimea 
and Russia’s continued aggressive acts in other parts of Ukraine” (Government of the United 
Kingdom 2014). In the Wales Summit Declaration NATO also decided to establish a Very High 
Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which is “a new allied force the will be able to deploy 
within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO’s 
territory” (Wales Summit Declaration 2014). According to former Defense Minister Søreide, 
who signed the agreement during the summit, the VJTF is an effort to make NATO more 
relevant and better suited to confront a new security situation (Søreide Eriksen, 2014). The 
Defense Minister also underscores that although Norway will provide forces to the VJTF, and 
that the creation of the force remains independent of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the 
illegal annexation of Crimea. (Søreide Eriksen, 2014). 
 In the aforementioned speech at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 2015, Prime 
Minister Solberg points to the fact that Russian military modernization and greater complexity in 
flights- and naval operations in the High North forces Norway to think differently in terms of 
security. Prime Minister Solberg does not, however, consider Russia to be a direct threat to 
Norway or Norwegian interests, which is in accordance with NATO’s views.  
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According to both Prime Minister Solberg and former Defense Minister Søreide, sea lines 
of communication in the North Atlantic appears to be a pressing issue for NATO and an issue 
Norway wants to bring to NATO’s attention. The potential for an anti-access challenge in the 
North-Atlantic, because of Russian armament in the High North, was former Defense Minister 
Søreide Eriksen’s key point in her speech at the Atlantic Council in 2015 (Søreide, 2015). In her 
speech at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in October 2015, Prime Minister Solberg called for 
increased focus and awareness from NATO’s side on the same issue, as sea denial will seriously 
hamper NATO’s ability to protect its allies. It is not farfetched to assume that Prime Minster 
Solberg had Norway in mind when saying so.  
NATO has agreed to a Norwegian offer to host a major, high-visibility exercise in the 
alliance’s northernmost area in 2018 (Norwegian Government 2015). According to former 
Defense Minister Søreide “we envisage a training scenario where the focus is on demonstrating 
deterrence and defense of this area of the alliance” (Norwegian Government 2015). 
Approximately 25.000 soldiers will participate in the exercise.  
 To summarize the above, we see that the Norwegian Government calls for more attention 
from NATO to the developing situation in the Arctic Sea and the High North because of Russian 
military- modernization and mobilization. The Norwegian government see this potentially 
leading to sea denial and closed sea lines of communication, which would hurt NATO’s ability 
to help its allies. Norway will participate in – and provide military personnel to - the newly 
established VJTF and will be the host for a major NATO military exercise in 2018. While NATO 
and Norway do not see a direct military threat from Russia, the abovementioned actions and 
recommendations do stem from a changed security scenario where Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea and aggressions in Eastern Ukraine play a big role.  
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Even though the following does not directly concern NATO, it is important to include the 
following observation as Norway. In 2017, the Norwegian government decided to welcome 330 
American soldiers to Værnes military base in mid-Norway. An agreement was made with the 
Norwegian government and American authorities, which allows the US soldiers to train and 
exercise in Norway on a rotational basis. The duration of the deal was later extended to 2018 
later that year. The decision by the Norwegian government was warmly welcomed by US 
authorities and the US Marine Corps, who was behind the imitative, but the decision also lacked 
broad political support in Norway and was criticized by some parties in the Storting (the 
Norwegian Parliament). The question was raised on whether this would lead to a permanent US 
military base in Norway, which would be a breach of domestic law in Norway which states that 
no foreign power is allowed to establish a military base on Norwegian soil.  
The decision to welcome American soldiers to train and exercise in Norway raised 
concern in Russia, who argues that it raises tension in High North according to Norwegian 
newspaper Dagens Næringsliv (2018). It did not help to cool down the Russian narrative when 
US Gen. Robert Neller during a visit to Værnes stated that “I hope I am wrong, but there is a war 
is coming… You are in a fight here, and informational fight, a political fight, by your presence”. 
Gen. Neller went on to say “Remember why you are here. They are watching. Just like you 
watch them. We have got 300 Marines up here; we could go from 300 to 3,000 overnight. We 
could raise the bar” (Seck, 2017). 
Norwegian newspaper Klassekampen revealed 7 October 2017 that the US Marines in 
internal documents have referred to the deployment to Værnes as permanent, and that the goal is 
to establish a permanent base with rotational deployments. The aforementioned document also 
included construction plans for the base. Klassekampen also refers to sources from within the 
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Norwegian government and military stating that “the agreement concerning ration-based training 
by US soldiers is de facto a permanent military base” (Tallaksen & Lysberg, 2017). The 
Norwegian government has categorically denied that the deal involves a permanent base, but 
evidence says otherwise.  
Economic Relations 
Sanctions  
 According to Forrer (2017), the most typical uses of economic sanctions to achieve 
foreign policy goals include: 
1) Compelling another country to change unwanted policies by inflicting a level of 
economic suffering for a sufficient duration of time to make retaining the offending 
policy, including regime change, intolerable. 
2) Deterring another country from adopting an unwanted policy in the future by inflicting a 
level of economic suffering for action(s) already taken commensurate with the 
grievousness of the action. 
3) Denying another country and others access to resources and financing that would be 
used to advance an unwanted policy or practice.  
4) Denying another country access to financial assets that could otherwise be used as 
reparations for actions of the sanctioned countries.  
5) Make a symbolic gesture to diplomatically isolate the sanctioned country but with no 
expectations that the economic sanctions will impact the unwanted policies. 
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The Norway Government decided to impose sanctions on trade and commerce with Russia 
15 August 2014, and to sharpen these sanctions 10 October the same year. The Norwegian 
sanctions are in accordance with the sanctions imposed by the European Union on 31 July and 12 
September. The sanctions are regulated through a provision of law titled “Provision of law 
concerning actions that undermine or threatens the territorial integrity, sovereignty, 
independence and stability of Ukraine” (Forskrift om tiltak vedr. Ukrainas integritet mv. 2014, 
authors translation). The sanctions include financial sanctions, banning import of goods from 
Crimea or Sevastopol, a weapon embargo and restrictions for Russian oil industry (Norwegian 
Government 2015).  Former Foreign Minister Børge Brende, underscored in October 2014 that 
the sanctions are a direct response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and their violation of 
International Law (Norwegian Government, 2017). Prime Minister Erna Solberg highlighted the 
need to act in a coordinated manner for the sanctions to be as effective as possible, when 
explaining the rationale behind signing on to the EU sanctions in 2014 (Sælebakke, 2014). 
 Shortly after the EU, USA and Norway and more put into action their sanctions directed 
at Russia, Russian President Vladimir Putin countered by imposing import sanctions on western 
food and agricultural products. Russia is Europe’s second-largest market for food and drink 
(Walker & Rankin, 2014). The Russian sanctions covers EUs 28 countries, USA, Norway, 
Canada and Australia. A graph from the British newspaper, The Daily Telegraph, illustrates that 
Norway is the country affected the most by the sanctions. For Norway, the value of sanctioned 
imports in Russia amounts to $1,158m (The Daily Telegraph, 2013). Bukkvoll, a researcher at 
the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, underscores that Russia’s relations to Norway 
is a mere trifle in this regard, and that Russia views the West as one entity in this regard (Aale, 
2014).  
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 The case of the Russian annexation of Crimea is not the first time Norway comes 
together with the EU on foreign policy issue. The Norwegian government monitors closely the 
EU’s common foreign policy, and in 2014 Norway signed on to 94 percent of the EU’s measures 
and declarations to which they were invited support (Danielsen, 2015). While the annexation of 
Ukraine remained on top of the agenda, Norway also supported measures concerning Libya, 
Syria and Venezuela in addition to supporting declarations condemning human rights violations 
in Iran, Uganda and Pakistan for instance.   
 Norway’s sanctions against Russia will be revisited and discussed further in chapter 5, 
when analyzing Norway’s policy response.  
Bilateral Relations 
Bilateral cooperation 
 After examining numerous newspaper articles press releases from the Norwegian 
Government, it becomes apparent that the Norwegian Government and Ministers on multiple 
occasions applies rhetoric that condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, but also highlight the need 
for sustained cooperation and dialogue. The aforementioned rhetoric includes condemning 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine and disregard for International Law, but it also includes the idea of 
separating Russia’s critique-worthy political discourse from the pragmatic and practical 
cooperation Norway and Russia has developed over time. Some examples of this type of rhetoric 
follows.  
 Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Børge Brende, explains in an article published in 
April 2015 that “Norway wants good and close relations to Russia, based on mutual interests and 
respect for fundamental international law” (Brende 2015, authors translation). Brende continues, 
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“Russia remains our neighbor despite the political situation. We therefore chose to continue our 
cooperation with Russia in many areas…However, it is not the appropriate time to return to a 
normal bilateral relationship” (Brende 2015, authors translation). Brende used similar rhetoric in 
his introduction speech at a meeting concerning Norway’s future foreign- and security policy 
convened by the Norwegian MFA in early 2016, in which Russia was a natural talking point. 
Brende stated “there is no contradiction in safeguarding our own [Norway’s] bilateral interests 
with Russia and at the same time, in accordance with allies and partners, promote international 
law and defend important principals” (Brende 2016, authors translation). In the same speech, 
Brende also mentions that practical cooperation and constructive dialog continues to characterize 
Norway’s relations with Russia, and points to the successful resolve of the refugee crisis with 
thousands of migrants crossing Norway and Russia’s shared border in the north. 
 In three press releases from the Ministry of Defense from 2014, mainly dealing with the 
suspension of bilateral military activities, the Norwegian Government also highlights the 
importance of retaining bilateral cooperation with Russia. This includes collaboration on Coast 
Guard, Border Guard, and search- and rescue activities, maritime safety, as well as the workings 
of the Incidents at Sea Agreement (Ministry of Defense 2014a, 2014b, 2014c). In an interview 
with CNN International, Defense Minister Søreide underscores that “we [the West] are faced 
with a different Russia… that does not mean that we will not [cooperate] with Russia. Norway 
has for decades [had] both practical and pragmatic cooperation [with Russia], and we still have a 
lot of it” (Søreide 2015).   
But events have occurred after the Russian annexation of Crimea that worsened Norway-
Russia relations. Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitrij Rogozin’s, unannounced visit to 
Svalbard, a Norwegian archipelago in the Arctic Ocean, 19 April 2015 caused great distress in 
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Norway-Russia relations. Russian President Putin has put Rogozin in charge of the developments 
in the High North, and he is described as an aggressive and nationalistic Russian politician who 
openly supported the annexation of Crimea (Jentoft, 2015). As a result of the EU’s and Norway’s 
sanctions towards Russia, Rogozin is a persona non grata in Norway and was not allowed to set 
foot on Norwegian soil. During his short visit to Svalbard, Rogozin underscored the importance 
of increased Russian presence in the Arctic and that we (Russia) will make the Arctic ours, 
according to Jentoft (2015). In addition, Rogozin mocked the Norwegian government on the 
microblog Twitter, and claimed that he was legally entitled to visit Svalbard as a co-signer to the 
Svalbard Treaty despite Svalbard being Norwegian territory (Jentoft, 2015). As a response, 
former Norwegian Foreign Affairs Minister ended up strengthening the sanctions by highlighting 
that they were also relevant for Svalbard.  
2017 was a significant year in Norway-Russia relations when attempts to some extent 
normalize bilateral relation failed. The Storting’s (Norwegian parliament) Foreign and Defense 
Committee long-time planned visit to Moscow was cancelled suddenly, as two members of the 
committee apparently turned out to be on a persona non grata-list. The remaining members of the 
committee therefore decided to cancel the visit as well. Members of the Norwegian government 
hoped that the committee’s visit could be the start of more normalized relations with Russia. 
According to Jentoft (2017), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was alerted by Russian 
authorities about persona non grata-list in November 2016, and furthermore that the Russian list 
likely is a direct response to EUs and Norway’s similar list of personas non grata and the 
reactions to the Svalbard incident mentioned above. Jentoft explains that the Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry did not want to alert the public and press about the list of banned Norwegians and made 
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attempts to strike a compromise with Russia while the planning for the committee’s visit was 
underway (Jentoft, 2017). The attempts were unsuccessful.   
 “The Migration Crisis”  
 During the fall of 2015 Norway experienced an unexpected flow of 5500 migrants, using 
bicycles as means of transportation, crossing the Norwegian border patrol at Storskog in the 
northernmost part of the country. Two research fellows at the Fritdjof Nansen Institute examines 
in an article from 2016 whether the sudden flow of migrants crossing Norway’s boarder through 
Russia was a result of deliberate Russian policy in order to destabilize Norway. Some observers, 
amongst them Stormark (2015), presents the idea that flow of migrants was a result Russian 
hybrid warfare, and that Russia channeled the migrants to the Norwegian boarder. Supposedly, 
Norway was given during a regular meeting between Norwegian and Russian security personnel 
an indirect warning about 15 000 non-Russian citizens finding themselves in Murmansk county 
close to Norway. Stormark (2015) also presents the idea that the Russian Intelligence Service 
(FSB) marketed the so called “Artic route” through social media and sold bicycles to the 
migrants, given the fact that you are not allowed to cross the border by foot. Another important 
element is why so few migrants decided to migrate to Finland, who with Russia shares a border 
that stretches significantly longer compared to the border shared by Norway and Russia. This 
question was also brought up by Norwegian government officials in the Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry according Stormark (2015). In addition, a reprisal for Norwegian imposed sanctions on 
Russia is also mentioned as a possible motive for Russia to deliberately channel migrants to 
Norway (Moe & Roe, 2016).  
It was on the basis of the abovementioned allegations that, Moe & Roe (2016), sought to 
bring answers to the table. They argue that the Russian border practices was not altered in any 
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significant way in 2015, and that Norway had a wrong impression of the Russian border regime 
being more restrictive than what it really was. The most plausible explanation for the sudden 
flow of migrants is according to Moe & Roe (2015) is the self-interest of migrants who happened 
to find a cheaper and less risky route.  
 The case of the migrants in Storskog is interesting and relevant for at least two reasons. 
1) Timing. The incident occurred relatively shortly (well over a year) after the Russian 
annexation of Crimea, which led to a worsened security scenario in Europe and a worsened 
relationship between Norway and Russia. 2) The changed nature of Norway-Russia relations due 
to the incidents in Ukraine: Norway had at this point condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine, 
imposed sanctions, and political and diplomatic contact was reduced. This was a sensitive case 
due to the dynamics in play, which potentially could further damage Norway-Russia relations if 
not dealt with in a precise matter.  
 Norway’s approach in handling this case has come under scrutiny. Rowe (2017) is one of 
the critics. He questions the fact that a case that in broad terms dealt with Norway-Russia 
relations at a sensitive time was handled by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the 
Migration Department, while skilled diplomats and the Foreign Ministry was sidelined. In a tit 
for tat manner, asylum-seekers was sent back and forth the Norwegian-Russian border. The 
Norwegian government returned migrants with one-time visas to Russia and ignored Russia’s 
clear message that they would not be accepted and hence returned to Norway again. According 
to Rowe (2017) this fostered increased distrust between the two parties. The fact that the 
Norwegian Government in September 2016 decided to build a 200-meter long and 3meter high 
fence at the cost of NOK 4 million along the border only manifested the Russian narrative of 
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western isolation from Russia and became a materialistic symbol of Norway’s distrust towards 
Russia (Rowe, 2017) 
     
Chapter 6: Analysis 
Explaining Norway’s response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine  
The introductory section of this research established that, from the end of the Cold War 
until 2014, the bilateral dimension of Norway-Russia relations dominated Norway’s foreign 
policy approach towards Russia. It was a time influenced by a desire from the Norwegian 
government to engage with Russia on multiple policy areas, such as the High North, military 
cooperation, trade and commerce and channels of communications were open and constructive. 
Norwegian government officials promoted the notion of “cooperation where possible”, 
pragmatism and a genuine desire to cooperate closely with its neighbors in the north. This 
culminated in major break-throughs such as the Incidents at Sea-treaty and the treaty on 
“Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean”, thereby solving a 
long-standing dispute in Norway-Russia relations. As previously mentioned, former Foreign 
Affairs Minister Støre said in 2008 that “these relations have practically never been as broad as 
they are now – yet considerable progress can still be made”. This despite Russian constrains on 
liberal values, such as freedom of press, human rights and transparency in politics, which are 
important elements in Norwegian domestic and foreign policy.  
Chapter 4 highlights new occurrences in Norway’s foreign policy that will now be tested 
against the thesis’ hypothesis, which argues that Norway’s Russia-policy has since the Russian 
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula shifted from a liberal approach to a more realist foreign 
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policy doctrine. It makes sense to go through each of the three sections outlined in chapter 4 
separately before reaching a conclusion. Each section includes explanations of how realist and 
liberal international relations theory would explain state behavior within that policy within the 
given policy area.  
 Defense and Security Structure   
The observations outlined in this research show that Norway spends more money on 
military and defense after the Russian annexation of Crimea. After examining Norway’s defense 
budgets from year 2000 until this day it clear that the Norwegian government significantly 
increased defense budgets starting with the 2015 defense budget, which was the first fiscal year 
after the Russian annexation of Crimea. After 2015, Norway continued to further increase 
defense spending up to 2018. The average 1,5% increase in defense spending from 2000-2014 is 
significantly lower compared to the numbers shown in table 1. We also know that a substantial 
chunk of the defense budgets from 2015-20016 has been earmarked for the procurement of 56 
new F-35 fighter jets. A section has been devoted to discussing the F-35 procurement process 
and highlighting scenarios, described in a classified document, in which the new fighter jets are 
put to use. Norway is in a full-scale war with Russia in one of the scenarios and the entire fleet of 
fighter jets are deployed to attack Russian targets. Based on the above, one can argue that a 
potential threat from Russia, in addition to other strategic defense and security interests, served 
as an important argument during the decision-making process when acquiring the new F-35 
fighter jets. Structural realist IR theory are able to predict Norway’s increased defense spending, 
investments and focus on strengthening military capabilities, as they are measures of balancing a 
potential Russian threat and increasing deterrence.  
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Another interesting element supporting the thesis’s hypothesis, is the influence the price 
of oil and threat perception have on defense spending. Both Norway’s and Russia’s economies 
rely heavily on production and export of oil and gas, and the sudden drop in oil prices in late 
2014 naturally affected the two countries economy to some extent. It is logical to assume that 
both oil prices and threat perception and influence defense spending in oil and gas-exporting 
countries. Berg and Kvalvik (2015) discusses the effect of oil prices and threat perception on 
projected defense spending for both Russia and Norway in the abovementioned report. In 
Norway, the period of 2014-2020, Berg and Kvalvik (2015) project that factors such as lower oil 
prices, demography and decreasing productivity levels will lead to an annual growth in GDP 
below 2,6%, which has been the average figure the last 40 years. Petroleum will no longer be 
such an important factor for growth in the Norwegian economy in the future, and contributions 
from the Norwegian Pension Fund to the national budget will decrease as a consequence. GDP 
growth, in real terms, is therefore expected to average 2,4% from 2015-2030, and 1,6% in 2030-
2060. It is also important to not under-communicate factors such as demography and 
macroeconomic trends in this regard. In other words, Norway is currently in a period where GDP 
growth is decreasing (Berg & Kvalvik, 2015). Why is Norway’s decreasing GDP growth 
relevant for this thesis? Decreasing GDP growth in relevant when discussed in the context of 
increased defense spending. The fact that defense spending increases in a period with decreasing 
GDP growth underscores the emphasis the Norwegian government currently put on defense and 
military capabilities, which in turn speaks to Norway’s threat perception of Russia.  
Russia is currently investing heavily in its military and find itself in the middle of a major 
military reform titled GPV-2027 State Arms Program worth more than 330 billion USD (Luzin, 
2018). There is however reasonable doubt concerning whether Russia will be able to fund this 
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mammoth of a weapons program, especially due to the fall in oil prices and the economic 
sanction imposed by the west including Norway, which has hurt Russia’s economy (Berg and 
Kvalvik, 2015). As of 2015, Russia was already spending 4% of GDP on defense and military, 
and the figure increased to 5,4% in 2016 (The World Bank, 2018). There is definitely a will in 
Russia to invest in defense and military, and according to Berg & Kvalvik (2015) this will 
probably raise Norway’s attention and desire to allocate money for defense purposes on the 
expense of other budget posts. Structural realism would predict this as military and defense 
measures is the highest prioritized issue in international relations.   
On the other hand, the Norwegian defense budgets are still well below the NATO target 
of 2 % of GDP. The latest numbers available from 2016, as official GDP numbers are available 
only 23 months after the end of the fiscal year, shows that Norway’s defense spending amounted 
to 1,55 % of GDP (Ministry of Defense, 2017-2018). This illustrates that Norway does not spend 
money on defense at the expense of other priorities, which is not what structural realism would 
predict as strengthening defense and military capabilities is not prioritized in an obvious manner.  
 NATO has multiple times been described as the bedrock in Norway’s defense and 
security strategy in this research. This is supported by Larsen (2018) who explains that Norway’s 
security and defense policy has over several decades depended on three pillars:  
1) That global security is secured through an institutionalized world order with the UN 
Charter and the UN Security Council as the highest-ranking organ. 
2) The US as our main allied and guarantor for security. 
3) NATO as an anchor for the defense of Norway and Norwegian sovereignty. 
The second and third pillar are tightly connected as the US is the largest contributor to NATO 
and with its nuclear arsenal constitute the most important element of deterrence. 
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After the Russian annexation of Crimea, the Norwegian government and government 
officials has at numerous occasions, including the NATO summit in Wales, reminded its allies 
and those listening that NATO is of utmost important to Norway. One can argue that this is a 
way of reassuring allies in NATO, and also reminding Russia, of their commitment to NATO 
and security cooperation. Some examples of Norway’s commitment are co-signing the Readiness 
Action Plan and hosting a major NATO military exercise in 2018. Norway also contributes to the 
establishment of the VJTF, which is meant to be deployed rapidly to NATO’s periphery 
especially. Norway (including the High North) is NATO in the north, and Norway has naturally 
attempted to increasingly shift NATO’s attention to the High North after Crimea by pointing to a 
potential anti-access threat in the case of Russian aggression. This may be viewed as an attempt 
to set the NATO’s agenda in Norway’s favor. In an unprecedented manner, depending on if one 
considers the US Marines establishment on Værnes military base to be permanent or not, 
Norway agreed to host foreign soldiers on Norwegian soil over a long period of time. This 
despite the unanswered question on whether the agreement is in violation of Norwegian law and 
resistance from some political parties in the Norwegian parliament. Regardless, there seem to be 
contradicting views within Norway, and between the Norwegian government and US Marines, 
on whether the arrangement is permanent or not. But the fact that Norway has suspended all 
bilateral military activities and cooperation with Russia, and instead sought closer cooperation 
with the US as its closest allied, remains indisputable. All of the abovementioned factors point in 
the direction that Norway is strengthening and reassuring military alliances and upping 
deterrence measures as an instrument to counter a potential Russian threat, which is a behavior in 
line with what structural realism would predict.  
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To conclude this section on security and defense posture, it is apparent that most of the 
elements discussed in this section speak in favor of the hypothesis of this research. There seem to 
be a shift in policy from wanting to engage with Russia in bilateral military activity with Russia 
to seizing these activities and instead increase focus on strengthening military capabilities and 
defense alliances, which is in line with what structural realism predicts.  
 Economic Relations 
Norway has since the Russian annexation of Crimea imposed sanctions on Russia, in line with 
likeminded states in the EU as well as the US. According to Forrer (2017), the most typical uses 
of economic sanctions to achieve foreign policy goals include: 
1) Compelling another country to change unwanted policies by inflicting a level of 
economic suffering for a sufficient duration of time to make retaining the offending 
policy, including regime change, intolerable. 
2) Deterring another country from adopting an unwanted policy in the future by inflicting a 
level of economic suffering for action(s) already taken commensurate with the 
grievousness of the action. 
3) Denying another country and others access to resources and financing that would be 
used to advance an unwanted policy or practice.  
4) Denying another country access to financial assets that could otherwise be used as 
reparations for actions of the sanctioned countries.  
5) Make a symbolic gesture to diplomatically isolate the sanctioned country but with no 
expectations that the economic sanctions will impact the unwanted policies. 
The first and third uses of economic sanctions in Forrer’s (2017) list is highly applicable in the 
case of Norway’s response to Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. Norway’s ultimate goal by imposing 
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sanctions on Russia is naturally to compel Russia to return Crimea to its rightful owners and 
adhere to International Law. Another goal is to hinder Russia to access resources and financing 
that would be used to further their super power ambitions. Returning to the realist assumption 
that military and economic power constitute the main instruments of power in international 
relations, structural realism is able to explain that imposing sanctions on Russia is a way of 
decreasing Russian economic and military power. The logic is quite straight-forward: By 
imposing signing on to a multilateral sanctions regime against Russia, Norway is takes part in 
inflicting economic suffering on Russia. How effective, and how much suffering these sanctions 
inflict, is unclear and perhaps a question for another research project. Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable that the western sanctions regime imposed on Russia, in addition to sinking oil prices, 
to some extent hampers Russia’s economy, and thereby disrupts Russia’s ability to complete its 
military build-up. Russia is currently, as previously explained, investing heavily in a major 
military reform amounting to the cost of 330 billion USD at the expense of other investments. 
The previous section also highlighted that Russia uses an increasing amount of GDP on military 
and defense – an amount that may increase if Russia insists on maintaining the military build-up 
while the economy suffers. 
 It has also been established that Russia’s counter sanctions on food and agricultural 
products against Norway inflict some level of economic suffering on Norway, mostly due to the 
fact that the Russian market makes a considerable part of Norway’s total export market for 
seafood. To compensate, Norway has found other markets for its export of seafood such as the 
Belarusian where exports have tripled after the Russian sanctions (Rørstad, 2014). While the 
Russian sanctions are far from ideal for Norway, they do not seem to impose a very significant 
 50 
level of economic suffering. Nevertheless, this tit for tat behavior from Norway-Russia is 
something structural realism would predict as a measure of balancing power.  
 To conclude this section, it undisputable that imposing economic sanctions on Russia 
marks a shift in Norway’s Russia-policy. Imposing sanctions to inflict economic suffering, and 
thereby hindering Russia in its military build-up can be predicted by structural realism. 
Bilateral Relations  
Previous sections have highlighted through quotes, statements and policies that the 
pragmatic and practical cooperation that, to large extent, defines the bilateral dimension of 
Norway-Russia relations continues despite the events in Ukraine. In the aftermath of Crimea, 
Norway decided to retain cooperation with Russia in some areas, such as coast guard, border 
guard, search-and-rescue activities and the workings of the Incident at Sea-treaty. In addition, 
Norway has retained contact between the Norwegian Joint Headquarter and the Russian Northern 
Fleet. Political leaders in Norway attended the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of 
liberation of Finnmark during WWII and celebrated the historical Norwegian-Russian 
cooperation. Despite some tension on the Storskog border and alleged Russian attempts to 
destabilize Norway, the two parties still managed to solve the crisis in a somewhat calm matter. 
This underscores the idea of separating bilateral cooperation from the political situation and a 
changed security scenario. We know that complex interdependence theory predicts states to 
prefer soft power and diplomacy over military measures as the cost of a potential war is too big. 
States would therefore turn to reassurance measures, confidence-building and diplomacy either 
bilateral or through international organizations. The above examples of retaining cooperation can 
be viewed as attempts reassurance measures.  
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On the other side, the Russian “aggression” in Svalbard as a symbolic protest against 
Norwegian policy and the refusal to allow Norwegian parliamentarians to conduct a political 
visit to Moscow shows that the status bilateral relations are far from normalized and on the 
contrary on an all-time low. Therefore, one can argue that little emphasis has been put on 
bilateral cooperation and confidence-building measures compared to defense and security and 
economic relations. This argument speaks in favor of the hypothesis of the research, namely that 
Norway’s Russia-policy has shifted towards a more realist policy doctrine. Complex 
interdependence theory would not predict this type of behavior from Norway. 
To conclude this section, there are still elements of cooperation and confidence-building 
in Norway’s Russia-policy after Crimea which complex interdependence can predict as a way of 
avoiding a military confrontation. However, these elements were more apparent in Norway’s 
Russia-policy prior to Crimea as illustrated in this research. Therefore, the lack of emphasis on 
these measures compared to defense and security speaks in favor of a shift in Norway’s Russia-
policy shifting towards a more realist policy doctrine.  
Chapter 7: What Have We Learned and the Road Ahead 
This research conclude that Norway has, in the aftermath of the Russian annexation of 
the Crimean Peninsula, conducted a foreign policy towards Russia that can be predicted and 
explained by the realist school in IR theory. To reach this conclusion, the research highlights 
Norway’s Russia-policy prior the Russian annexation of Crimea and illustrate that the modus 
operandi in Norway’s Russia-policy up to that point was predominately shaped by the bilateral 
dimension, which encourage tighter cooperation and strengthening bilateral relations. By 
outlining relevant policy areas in Norway’s Russia-policy, after the Russia’s annexation of 
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Crimea and a changed security scenario in Europe, the thesis illustrates that there has been a shift 
in Norway’s Russia-policy. Finally, these observations are analyzed and explained through the 
lens of IR theory. On the basis of the above, the thesis conclude that Norway’s Russia-policy 
after Crimea is predominately realist-oriented, but efforts are still made to maintain somewhat 
normalized bilateral relations which can be explain by neoliberal IR theory. 
Norway-Russia relations are at an all-time low due to Russia’s disregard for International 
Law and annexation of Crimea. There is a cold front between the west, including Norway, and 
Russia. It is a developing and dynamic situation that should be monitored further and given 
continued academic attention. Future research should test the findings in this research, and 
further inquiry into the effects of the shift in Norwegian policy. As Russia continues its military 
build-up, the already apparent asymmetric nature of Norway-Russia relations in terms of power 
will continue to increase. This may lead to a growing threat perception from the Norway’s side, 
which can and probably will affect future policy-making.  
Norway and the west deem the Russian annexation of Crimea as an attempt to increase its 
power and sphere of influence – a step forward in their ambitions of becoming a super power. On 
the contrary, Russia believe that they have a rightful claim to Crimea and that western 
expansionism into Russia’s strategic areas forced them to take action. Norway and the west want 
to see Russia return Crimea to Ukraine and act in a manner according to International Law and a 
western standard of norms and values. It has become clear that Russia does not share the 
emphasis on these norms and values, and that Russia and the west are on a collision course. For 
Norway, this means that the importance of Norway-Russia relations is more important than ever 
as Norway’s and Russia’s strategic national interests are mutually overlapping in the High North. 
Will Russia in the future, with its superior military capabilities, be willing to cooperate with 
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Norway in the High North? Will they adhere to bi- and multilateral frameworks for cooperation? 
Will they share slowly unveiling resources in the Arctic? And will they be a reliable partner in 
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